Summary

In this paper I discuss and make comparisons between two related texts which were both written by John Toland during the productive period of his association with the Court of Sophie Charlotte, the Queen of Prussia. Between August and November 1702 he joined her intellectual circle, which included Gottfried Leibniz, and was prominent in free discussions she encouraged about religious matters and relevant philosophical questions. The Queen seems to have asked for written papers to be prepared and presented, sometimes on both sides of a controversy, and other manuscripts also passed between members of the circle. Some of the resulting texts, including some of the exchanges between Toland and Leibniz, have survived and their provenance is generally recognized\(^1\). There are, however, surviving texts where this is not so, including, though in different ways, the two letters of Toland discussed here.

One of these, which I refer to simply as the Remarques, takes the form of a letter to the Queen attacking Leibniz’s metaphysical system. It was published anonymously in 1716\(^2\), when Leibniz concluded it was not the work of Toland. The Remarques has been entirely neglected so far by those who have attempted to expound Toland’s thought and it has usually been omitted from bibliogra-
phies of his work. But recent scholarship puts Toland’s authorship beyond doubt. There has never been any doubt about the authorship of the other text I discuss, which is familiar to students of Toland as the fifth and last of his Letters to Serena. But its provenance has remained a mystery. I identify “the noble Friend” to whom it is addressed and its context in the discussions of some members of the Queen’s circle.

The evidence for attributing the Remarques to Toland depends mostly upon a close comparison between these two letters, which are found to overlap, particularly in the critique of the use of abstract notions and of the extension of mathematical notions into philosophy. Here I explore the overlap further, arguing that Letters V was written first and that Toland effectively plagiarized parts of it when drafting his critique of Leibniz. Nonetheless the addition of the Remarques to the canon of his writings helps the interpretation of Toland’s thought during this period. It clarifies and enlarges upon some of Toland’s most distinctive philosophical ideas. Even where the two texts appear to differ a better interpretation may result from considering how they may be reconciled.

The paper concludes by considering a striking discrepancy between the comprehensive materialism apparently adopted in the Remarques and the conclusion of Letters V that we need to admit a “presiding Intelligence” that is responsible for the amazing degree of organisation to be found in nature. I conclude by suggesting an interpretation which reconciles the apparent theism of Letters V with the materialism of the Remarques. I suggest that Toland did not, even at this stage, subscribe to the “materialistic pantheism” usually credited to him but already held the “dualistic pantheism” of his later writings.

1. Toland’s critique of Leibniz’s “New system”

The Remarques was written, according to the author, upon the instruction of the Queen of Prussia. She took a particular interest in the published exchanges between Leibniz and Bayle and, it
seems, Leibniz had given her a copy of an intended reply to Bayle's latest contribution in the 1702 edition of his Dictionnaire historique et critique. The author of the Remarques writes that the Queen had passed him this éclaircissement by Leibniz and asked for his opinion of it. The Remarques is written in the form of a letter to the Queen and refers to previous discussions with her. It gives Berlin as the place where it was written and is dated 14 January, 1703.

The first Leibniz knew of this letter was in 1716, when it was published amongst several items, including that unpublished reply of his to Bayle, in the Histoire critique. He had good reason to suspect that the author was Toland. The philosophical perspective of the letter-writer was just that blend of Lockean epistemology and materialistic metaphysics which had been incorporated in a lost paper of Toland's against which Leibniz had, on the instruction of the Queen, written his well-known “Lettre touchant ce qui est independent des sens”7. Moreover the letter-writer compared Leibniz unfavourably with “our celebrated Newton”8 and, picking up on the reference to “our ... Newton”, Leibniz inferred that the author was an Englishman9. Moreover Leibniz knew, he admitted to a correspondent, “hardly any other Englishman with whom the Queen had been able to discuss philosophy”10.

At the same time there seemed to Leibniz to be strong reasons for believing that Toland did not write the piece, especially and conclusively that Toland was no longer in Berlin by January, 1703. Leibniz knew Toland had passed through Hanover on his way back to England, via the Netherlands, in late November, 170211. Moreover, since he himself remained in Berlin until February 1703, he would surely have known about it if Toland (who caused quite a stir) had been back in the city and in communication with the Queen12. Scholars since, less well-placed than Leibniz, have understandably hesitated to attribute the Remarques positively to Toland. In consequence those interested in expounding Toland's ideas have been discouraged from relying on it as they rely on the Letters to Serena and other works that are part of the full canon of authentic Toland writings13. Recent scholarship, however, invites us to consider the Remarques as an integral part of his output in the
period of the Letters to Serena. Toland himself had indicated in his Preface to the Letters to Serena that there were further letters to the Queen of Prussia in addition to the three included in the work bearing that title\textsuperscript{14}. It is very likely that the Remarques is one of those further letters for the Queen that already existed in a rough form\textsuperscript{15}. It underwent some further revision at some hand after 1714\textsuperscript{16}. And it has been suggested that Toland himself put finishing touches to it at this later stage, by which time he might reasonably be supposed to have been capable of forgetting that it was 1702 and not 1703 that he had received Leibniz’s paper from the Queen in Berlin\textsuperscript{17}. But internal evidence suggests that it is very substantially the product of the same period of thinking and writing as Letters V.

2. Toland’s reply to his “noble Friend”

The last of the Letters to Serena is entitled “Motion essential to Matter; in Answer to some Remarks by a noble Friend on the Confutation of Spinoza”. The “Confutation of Spinoza”, published as Letters IV, had been written to “a Gentleman in Holland”. There Toland had argued that Spinoza, by failing to give an adequate account of the nature and cause of motion, had built a system without firm foundations. His “noble Friend” had written in an approving way of Toland’s critique of Spinoza but had objected to Toland’s own view that matter is necessarily active as well as extended.

It seems that this reference to a “noble Friend” is not merely a literary device. For Letters V concludes by referring to future discussions between them and “our common Friend, who alone philosophizes at Court, and who exceeds all the rest in Politeness and Address, as much as he does in Wisdom and Literature...”\textsuperscript{18}. If this is taken, following Lamarra, as a reference to Leibniz\textsuperscript{19} and the court is taken therefore to be that of the Queen of Prussia, as seems most likely\textsuperscript{20}, then the “noble Friend” is almost certainly the man usually referred to in the Leibniz literature as Jakob Heinrich von
This Saxon nobleman – referred to at the Court as a count – visited Berlin with his wife in Autumn, 1702. Moreover he was involved in discussions with Leibniz and Toland when they accompanied the Queen to her retreat in Lützenburg. Flemming took a critical interest in Toland’s ideas, writing an intervention in the Leibniz-Toland debate in which he opposed himself to Toland’s ideas at just the same points as did the “noble friend”. Flemming thought, according to Leibniz, that “the immaterial is active and the material passive”, that living things are inferior active beings (being also material and passive) and that only God is a fully immaterial and active being. We may safely infer that he would have disagreed entirely with Toland’s claim in the “Confutation of Spinosa” that matter is essentially active. On the contrary, Flemming evidently believed in a transcendent immaterial deity who was the true source of activity in the material world. So he might well have objected, as the “noble friend” did, that, “after admitting the Activity of Matter, there seems to be no need of a presiding Intelligence”.

The piece referred to by Leibniz as written by “Monsieur le comte de Fleming” was evidently not the very one replied to in Letters V. Nonetheless it establishes Flemming as someone who wrote philosophical notes opposing Toland at points where he was also opposed by the “noble Friend”. Thus there is internal as well as strong circumstantial evidence for identifying Flemming as the noble friend who wrote the (now presumably lost) comments on Toland’s “Confutation of Spinosa” and to whom the last of the Letters to Serena was addressed.

It seems likely that the “Confutation of Spinosa” was the subject of discussions at Lützenburg sometime between 27 September and 14 October but that Letters V was not completed until after Toland’s return to Berlin. Since, however, Letters V concludes by anticipating further discussions with the “noble Friend” (Flemming) and “our common Friend” (Leibniz), it is likely to have been written before Toland left Berlin in mid-November, 1702. It seems a reasonable conjecture, then, that the original (French) letter to the “noble Friend” was written for Flemming sometime between mid-October and mid-November, 1702.
3. The priority of the letter to a “noble Friend”

Leibniz had completed his reply to Bayle and sent it to him by 19 August, 1702. It is likely that he discussed it with the Queen, who took a particular interest in Bayle, and presumably at some stage he gave her a copy of it. Toland for his part had arrived at Lützenburg by the end of July. Notwithstanding the date (14 January, 1703) which appears at the end of the published letter, it seems from the available external evidence as if he wrote the Remarques rather earlier, sometime between August and when he left Berlin in the middle of November, 1702. There is, moreover, internal evidence which suggests that the Remarques was written later than the draft of Letters V. For, as I here argue, it seems that certain passages were lifted from the letter to the “noble Friend” and inserted into the Remarques, in which case the latter work would probably also have been written in the last month of Toland’s visit.

There are several passages in the Remarques which correspond very closely to passages in Letters V, none more extensively than where the author presents a critique of the use of abstracted notions in philosophy and, more particularly, of the use of mathematical abstractions. This is the point where the text of the Remarques seems, as I argue shortly, to have largely been taken from § 11 of the other letter. Here is the passage from Letters V, with the borrowings indicated in the footnotes:

11. I hinted something to you before about the abuse of Words in Philosophy, and we may instance particularly certain Terms invented to very good purpose by Mathematicians; but misunderstood or perverted by others, and not seldom very wrongly apply’d by certain Mathematicians themselves, which can never fail to happen when abstracted Notions are taken for real Beings, and then laid down as Principles whereon to build Hypotheses. Thus the Mathematical Lines, Surfaces, and Points have bin maintain’d to exist in reality, and many Conclusions thence deduc’d, tho very unhappily; as that Extention was compounded of Points, which is to say, that Length, Breadth, and Thickness are form’d of what is neither long, nor broad, nor thick, or Measure of
no Quantity. So the word Infinite has bin wonderfully perplex’d; which has given occasion to a thousand Equivocations and Errors. Number was made infinite; as if it follow’d, because Units may be added to one another without end, that there actually existed an infinite Number. Of this nature are infinite Time, the infinite Cogitation of Man, asymptotic Lines, and a great many other boundless Progressions, which are infinite only with respect to the Operations of our Minds, but not so in themselves. For whatever is really infinite, does actually exist as such; whereas what only may be infinite, is very positively not so.

Here now is an English translation of the “corresponding” paragraph from the Remarques. I have used the language of the author of Letters to Serena where it corresponds and underlined the passages which appear to be taken from Letter V:

Allow me to remind you, Madame, of something you have done me the honour of saying more than once, that of all those who dabble in philosophy, the mathematicians satisfy you the least – especially when they want to explain the nature of things in general or the nature of the soul in particular. And you have been surprised that, despite their geometrical exactitude, metaphysical ideas are for most of them a wonderland [literally “lost country”] and an inexhaustible source of chimeras. That remark is without doubt very judicious, Madame, and it seems to me very easy to find the reason for mathematicians having this turn of mind. When abstracted notions are taken for real beings, or relative ideas pass for absolute things, it is as if similarities or comparisons are taken as solid and accurate proofs. Thus certain terms, invented to very good purpose by mathematicians to focus the imagination and the better to construct their calculi, have been misunderstood by others. And they have sometimes been wrongly applied by certain mathematicians, who – instead of using them as architects use scaffolds, for the convenience of workmen – have laid them down as fundamental principles whereon they have built hypotheses. In this way Lines, Surfaces, and Mathematical Points have bin maintain’d to exist in reality, and many Conclusions readily deduc’d, such as that Extention was compounded of mathematical Points, which is to say, that Length, Breadth, and
Thickness are form'd of what is neither long, nor broad, nor thick, or Measure of no Quantity. So the word Infinite has bin wonderfully perplex'd; which has given occasion to a thousand Equivocations and Errors. Number was made infinite, as if it were something real. And, because our mind can go on adding Units to one another without end (putting it crudely), it has been concluded that there actually existed an infinite Number. Of this nature are infinite Time, the infinite Cogitation of Man, asymptot Lines, and a great many other boundless Progressions, which are infinite only with respect to the Operations of our Minds, but not so in themselves. For whatever is really infinite, does actually exist as such; whereas what only may be infinite, is very positively not so 

It seems clear that either one passage is borrowed from the other or they are taken from a common source. My suggestion is that the Remarques passage is a re-use or adaptation of certain passages in Letters V. More strictly, since French was the language of the Berlin Court at that time, we must suppose they are derived from a draft or a copy of the French original. My evidence for this hypothesis is that the passage in Letters V § 11 fits perfectly well into its context whereas the corresponding passage in the Remarques does not fit at all well in the context where it appears. This is true at two levels. At an editorial level the first passage is prepared for by the preceding sections and in turn prepares the ground for what follows, suggesting continuity in drafting. This is not so with the corresponding passage in the Remarques, which is discontinuous with what comes before and after. At a deeper level the criticism in Letters V locks onto the target at which it is aimed in a way in which it fails to do in the Remarques.

Beginning at the editorial level, the passage appears in Letters V when there already has been a certain amount of discussion of the abuse of relative words by their being made absolute – which is indeed a major point of that text as a whole. The contrast is drawn between things which are conceived with respect to ourselves and things conceived according to their true nature. There is a related contrast between “mer Comparisons of the Mind” and “the Names
of ... positive Subjects”\textsuperscript{40}. There has also been discussion of the attempt by philosophers to form an abstract notion of matter without motion.

Toland goes on in \textsection 12 of Letters V to say that no word has been more misapplied or given more occasion for dispute than the word “Space”. The misuse is later linked to the misunderstandings of points, surfaces and lines in mathematics. Because (some) mathematicians made use of the “abstracted notion” of space conceived as separate from matter, the philosophers

imagin’d a real Space distinct from Matter, which they held to be extended, incorporeal, immovable, homogeneal, indivisible, and infinite\textsuperscript{41}.

The mathematician-turned-philosopher whom Toland had particularly in mind here was Joseph Raphson, an associate of Newton who had distinguished himself as the author of a work presenting a method of solving equations\textsuperscript{42}. Further editions of this purely mathematical work in 1697 and 1702 contained as an annex a longer work of “mathematical metaphysics” entitled De spatio reali\textsuperscript{43}. Toland refers explicitly to “the ingenious Mr RALPHSON’s [sic] Book of Real Space” and acknowledges that it is to him that he “had an eye” in the previous paragraphs\textsuperscript{44}. Raphson does indeed distinguish between real space and finite extension and stresses the immovable, indivisible, eternal, incorporeal and all-containing nature of real space\textsuperscript{45}. As Toland notes, Raphson did not claim to be the first to hold this view\textsuperscript{46}. Nonetheless he seems to have become for Toland the paradigm of the good mathematician turned bad philosopher, who is guilty of mistaking abstractions that were of “singular use to Mathematicians on several occasions” for realities\textsuperscript{47}. Toland was fully aware that, in opposing absolute space as a mere abstraction, he would be thought “to have the greatest Man in the world” against him and he covered himself by saying that it would not detract from Newton’s standing if he happened to be mistaken in this matter and that, in any case, Newton might be interpreted as “favourable to my Opinion”\textsuperscript{48}. However that may be, his criticisms of the mathematical philosophers in Letters V are
most clearly focussed on Raphson and are response to his book on “Real Space”.

At any rate, § 11 fits very well into the context of Letters V as a whole. By contrast, the corresponding passage of the Remarques does not fit at all well into its context. It is not adequately prepared for. There is no explanation given in that context of the contrasts between “abstracted notions” and “real beings” or between “relative ideas” and “absolute things”. The author does not explain how his diagnosis of the tendency of mathematicians to get lost when doing metaphysics applies to the case of Leibniz. He did earlier attribute to Leibniz the view that souls are “intelligent points” and, since points are not real beings for Toland, but mere abstractions, it is possible that he saw Leibniz’s monadology as based on abstraction. But, instead of following this through, he reverts to his controversy with the Newtonians on the question of gravity as an attribute of matter. His rhetoric gives the illusion that his disagreement with Newton is only a minor one whereas his argument implies that Newton himself was an “excellent mathematician” (for constructing the Inverse Square Law) but a “mediocre philosopher” (for inferring specific gravitational forces in nature). Though it is clearly Leibniz and not Newton against whom he directed the jibe that one can be an excellent mathematician but still only a mediocre philosopher, it is Newton who is Toland’s quarry for the rest of the letter. Here he is pursuing one aspect of the same theme as that of Letters V, namely, that we can accept Newton’s physics without reading these abstract notions (gravity, motion, rest, space and time, and so on) into the nature of things. In short, Toland was still pre-occupied with the project of unpicking the mathematics from the philosophy in Newton’s mathematical philosophy, a project which was not pertinent to his critique of Leibniz at all.

It is not known exactly when Toland wrote the Remarques but the evidence of “self-plagiarization” puts it later than the original of Letters V. This means that, if it was written in Berlin, it was written before his departure in mid-November, 1702: and, if it was completed on 14 January, 1703, it was written after his return to England.
4. Toland: materialist, theist or what kind of pantheist?

When the two texts are closely examined it becomes apparent that, where the topics of the two letters overlap, there is a close correspondence in their philosophical content. There are indeed a number of doctrines common to both papers which are worth exploring further, including Toland’s critique of abstract notions and his “instrumentalism” about the mathematical sciences, which is hinted at in the Letters to Serena and more fully developed in the Remarques. It is the more remarkable, therefore, that the two texts appear to point in different directions on a topic central to the interpretation of Toland’s thought. The Remarques, so far as it goes, is a thoroughly materialistic work, which is quite scathing about “atoms of mind.” Letters V, by contrast, concludes by appearing to admit a “presiding Intelligence”, a “pure Spirit” which is responsible for the order in the Universe. To be sure, the Remarques does not deny a “presiding Intelligence”, neither does Letters V affirm that there are any finite mental substances. But the Remarques does appear to equate Matter with the one substance and indeed with reality tout court. And this seems to preclude the existence of any mental substances whatever, including the “pure Spirit” apparently admitted in Letters V. Contrariwise, if a “pure Spirit” is admitted as in Letters V, then a comprehensive materialism such as that of the Remarques must be rejected.

The last of the so-called Letters to Serena was occasioned, as we have seen, by objections raised by Flemming to Toland’s philosophy, as it emerged in his “Confutation of Spinosa”. The most grave objection was that, if we suppose matter to be essentially active, then we have no need to suppose a “presiding Intelligence”. Toland replied that the infinity of matter only excluded “an extended corporeal God, but not a pure Spirit or immaterial Being”. Indeed, he insisted, such an Intelligence must be supposed if we are to make sense of the order and organisation of the world:

All the jumbling of Atoms, all the Chances you can suppose for it, cou’d no more bring the Parts of the Universe into their present Order, nor
cause the Organization of a Flower or a Fly, than you can imagine that by tumbling together the Letters of a Printer a million of times, they should ever fall at last into such a Position, as to make the Æneid of VIR-GIL, or the Iliad of HOMER, or any other Book in the world.

Letters V thus appears to stop well short of a thorough-going materialism by admitting a pure Spirit or Mind who is responsible for the order in the universe. Toland seems, indeed, to endorse a version of the theistic Design Argument.

The Remarques, by contrast, seems to endorse an unqualified materialism. In it Toland rejects mental substances and aligns himself with those who maintain that “matter is the only substance in the universe”:

... according to me, substance, reality, or the universe is infinite, and so what may be called its continuity is never really divided up, consequently there are no independent parts of matter. Particular bodies are only mentally divided from universal extension by their modifications. These [modifications] themselves, however, are nothing real but are only relative to us and our way of thinking about things.

Toland does not dwell on the point but his equation of the universe and (the one material) substance with reality (“la Réalité”) leaves, taken strictly, no place for a transcendent God. To be sure, this topic is not squarely addressed in the Remarques. Nonetheless Toland’s statement is, on a plain interpretation, diametrically at odds with the apparently theistic conclusion of Letters V.

What is to be made of this inconsistency? To answer this question we need to bear in mind other remarks by Toland on relevant topics in this period, both about the nature of mind and about the existence or otherwise of a deity. We also need to address a tricky methodological issue central to the interpretation of Toland’s thought – namely, how to distinguish the “esoteric” philosophy that most truly reflected his thought from his “exoteric” or “public” philosophy, which in some degree at least, did not.

Taking the second point first, the author of the Letters to Serena,
despite the at least relative frankness with which he had been able to state his views in the company of Leibniz, Flemming and the Queen of Prussia, was clearly already very well aware of the option available to writers on religious and philosophical questions, of disguising their true beliefs. In one of the earlier letters, we read that most of the Philosophers ... had two sorts of Doctrins ... the one private and the other publick; the latter to be indifferently communicated to all the World, and the former only very cautiously to their best Friends, or to some few others capable of receiving it, and that wou’d not make ill use of the same⁵⁷.

We are further told that Pythagoras himself did not believe in the transmigration of souls but held an “internal or secret Doctrine” of a materialistic sort. His “external and popular” doctrine encouraged the mob to believe that “they shou’d become various kinds of Beasts after Death, thereby to deter ’em more effectually from Wickedness”. But the italicized words are “equivocal” and can bear a quite different interpretation. For the “internal or secret Doctrine” of Pythagoras was:

no more than the eternal Revolution of Forms in Matter, those which turn every thing into all things, and all things into any thing, as Vegetables and Animals become part of us, we become part of them...⁵⁸

A number of interpreters have thought that Toland, who also made public profession of belief in immortality and who also thought that the function of such belief in the public mind was to deter the wrong-doer, was similarly committed to holding quite different views privately⁵⁹. Indeed the views Toland fostered on Pythagoras as his “secret” doctrine seem to be just such a combination of the ideas of Lucretius and Bruno as were attractive to the author of the Letters to Serena. And such views would fit well with the materialist doctrine of the Remarques.

To understand Toland’s position at this point, however, we need to bear in mind that by 1702 he had already toyed with two forms
of what might be called pantheism and indeed was soon (in 1705) to refer to himself as a “pantheist”\textsuperscript{60}. In the poem Clito (1700) he floated two pantheistic alternatives to a conventional theistic belief in a transcendent creator God: one, where God is “the World’s great Soul” and the other, where God is a whole of which the creatures are parts. As Toland expands on this latter option it becomes clear that it is a form of materialism and indeed that it would aptly be described as “pantheistic materialism”:

\begin{quote}
Or parts the Creatures are, and God the whole
From whence all Beings their existence have,
And into which resolv’d they find a Grave;
How nothing’s lost, though all things change their Form,
As that’s a Fly which is but now a worm;
And Death is only to begin to be
Some other thing, which endless change shall see;
(Then why should men to dy have so great fear?)
Tho nought’s Immortal, all Eternal be\textsuperscript{61}.
\end{quote}

The view expressed here is very similar to what Toland was to insinuate in Letters II as the “private philosophy” of Pythagoras. Everything is eternal since creatures that die are caught up in “the eternal Revolution of Forms in Matter”. But strictly, and contrary to Pythagoras’s public teaching, individual souls do not survive and so, as Toland puts it in Clito, “nought’s Immortal”. God and creatures are not indeed separate individuals but rather “parts the Creatures are, and God the whole”.

Neither God nor immortality is mentioned in the Remarques. But Toland there denies the existence of more than one substance and indeed equates that substance with Matter. There are no “small indivisible substances” such as Leibniz claimed. Nor are there even “independent parts of Matter”, our idea of particulars being purely conventional, they being “nothing real, but only something relative to us and to our way of conceiving things”\textsuperscript{62}. The Remarques, taken at face value, embraces a full-bloodied materialism. That is consistent with the epiphenomenalist view of mind as
somehow resulting from matter which Toland defended against Bayle. It also fits nicely with the materialistic pantheism floated in Clito, where God is identified with Matter or with Nature (as commonly understood).

It does not, however, fit with the conclusion of Letters V that there is a presiding Intelligence which gives the world the order it has. It is tempting, therefore, once the distinction is drawn between a public philosophy and a private one, to dismiss that conclusion of Letters V as only offered for public consumption and not as a true statement of what Toland really believed. Thus David Berman has claimed that Letters V has “a logical tendency ... toward materialistic pantheism”. Since Berman takes it that “allowing motion to be essential to matter undermines the most compelling reason for positing a transcendent cause of the world”, he identifies the so-called “materialistic pantheism” with the true (secret) philosophy of Toland and the professed belief in an “immaterial presiding intelligence” as the public philosophy. But Berman mistakes Toland’s thought. For while Toland does indeed want to posit an eternal Matter rather than a transcendent cause of a material world, his arguments for supposing that the order in the world requires a Mind seem to be ones that he accepted himself.

My reason for thinking this is that these are strong arguments from what can be supposed to be Toland’s point of view. So much so, indeed, that it is difficult to understand how he himself could be supposed to be indifferent to their force and resistant to the conclusions to which they led. Toland quite correctly points out the logical fault in Flemming’s inference from his belief in the essential activity of matter to atheism. God, as he points out, “was able to create this Matter active as well as extended” and so could just as well have built activity into the material universe in the first place. Hence belief in an infinite and essentially active universe does not exclude belief in a creator God. Toland, in short, was not committed to atheism by the arguments of Letters IV. Moreover, the objection to comprehensive materialism – that it cannot explain how the universe came to have the intricate order it has – was one which atheists at that time found it particularly difficult to answer. In the absence
of such a counter-argument available to him but, for reasons of tact, not deployed in Letters V, it is a reasonable inference that Toland was himself impressed by the argument he offered Flemming.

There is, therefore, some reason to interpret the position of Letters V as being theistic. It seems clear that it was intended to be taken as such. But, while this is clearly inconsistent with materialistic pantheism or what more accurately should be called “panhyliism”67, it may fit as well with the other form of pantheism Toland floats in Clito, where God is identified with “the Soul of the World”. Toland was later to endorse this view of God as “the Mind, if you please, and Soul of the Universe”, which he suggested is separated from the Universe itself only by a distinction of reason68. But this view is not inconsistent with his view of the eternity of Matter. And he seems, in the end, to have adopted a dualistic pantheism in which both the eternity of Mind and the eternity of Matter are recognized. This is akin to the use of the term “pantheism” as encapsulated earlier by Raphson69. Such a dualistic pantheism is expressed by the epitaph Toland wrote for himself:

Spiritus cum aethero patre,  
A quo prodiit olim, conjungitur:  
Corpus item, naturae cadens,  
In matrem gremio reponitur.  
Ipse vero aeternum est resurrecturus,  
At item futurus TOLANDUS nunquam70.

From the pantheistic perspective of the later Toland it is possible to reconcile the materialism of the Remarques with the “pure Spirit” admitted in Letters V. The father/mother duality retains the denial of finite individual substances, whether mental or material, which is a prominent feature of the Remarques. It retains the denial of immortality (at any rate as involving the retention of individual personal identity) which is a corollary of the denial of finite individual substances. At the same time the “etherial father” (the Soul of the Universe) is co-eternal with mother Nature71. Thus room is left for the “pure Spirit” of Letters V, interpreted in a pantheistic
rather than a theistic way. Hence, although Toland’s profession of belief in a “pure Spirit” responsible for the order in the world is indeed to be interpreted in terms of his double philosophy, we do not need to suppose that he was merely lying in his teeth. It seems, indeed, to have been contrary to his principles to do that. He was in truth admitting a “pure Spirit” even although he was not disclosing his heterodox views about the immanence of this Spirit in the world.

However, even if the two letters can be reconciled from the perspective of the dualistic pantheism adopted by the later Toland, that is not sufficient reason of itself to interpret the earlier Toland in that way. Neither is there, so far as I know, direct evidence from Toland’s writings to confirm that he held such a view as early as 1702. Nonetheless there is circumstantial evidence in a paper Leibniz wrote during the time of his debates with Toland in 1702, his “Considerations sur a doctrine d’un Esprit Universal Unique”. Though directed against a wide range of views, ancient and modern, this paper is at a number of points relevant to Leibniz’s debates with Toland, suggesting, as it does, reasons why some (like Toland) were tempted to deny the existence of “particular souls” and blaming those who believed in the false doctrine of souls separated from bodies for driving people to believe in a single universal spirit. Leibniz goes on to consider the consequences of the view that “there is nothing in nature but the universal spirit and matter”. Though Toland is not mentioned it seems very probable that Leibniz had him in mind at this point. If so, then this is some evidence that Toland was already committed to the kind of dualistic pantheism on the basis of which the apparent conflict between the pure Spirit admitted in Letters V and the eternal Matter of the Remarques can be reconciled.

ABBREVIATIONS


Histoire critique = Histoire critique de la république des lettres tant ancienne que moderne.


NOTES

1 Papers written for the Queen that survive include the first three of Toland’s Letters to Serena, Leibniz’s well-known Lettre sur ce qui passe les sens et la matière (Klopp X, p. 147 ff.), Toland’s reply (Klopp X, pp. 167-177) and Leibniz’s rejoinder (Klopp X, p. 178 ff.). Other manuscripts include, as I bring out here, the originals of the last two of the Letters to Serena. Several other manuscripts that had some circulation in this circle are referred to in the course of this paper, including some lost papers by Toland and a paper by Leibniz that has not yet been put in its proper context.

2 The title is Remarques Critiques sur le Système de Monsr. Leibnitz de l’Harmonie préétalable; où l’on recherche en passant pourquoi les Systèmes Metaphysiques des Mathematiciens ont moins de clarté, que ceux des autres: écrites par ordre de Sa Majeste la feuë Reine De Prusse". It was published in the Histoire critique de la
république des lettres... XI, 1716, pp. 116-128. References to this letter here are to “Histoire critique, XI” followed by the appropriate page number.

3 For instance, it is omitted from the bibliography of Toland’s works appended to the 1997 edition of Christianity not Mysterious: Text, Associated Works and Critical Essays, eds Philip Mc Guinness, Alan Harrison & Richard Kearney, Dublin, Lilliput Press, 1997. That is noteworthy since these editors are critical of other recent scholars who are too inclusive and are even doubtful whether Toland “wrote much of what they list” (Christianity, p. 329). Giancarlo Carabelli, in his Tolandiana: Materiali bibliografici per lo studio dell’opera e della fortuna di John Toland (1670-1722), Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1975, includes the Remarques and reflects the then state of scholarly opinion by listing secondary literature in which it is attributed to Toland “dubitativamente” (p. 195).

4 This was first established by Antonio Lamarra in An Anonymous Criticism from Berlin to Leibniz’s Philosophy: John Toland against Mathematical Abstractions, “Studia Leibnitiana”, Sonderheft 16, 1990, pp. 89-102. See also R. S. Woolhouse, John Toland and “Remarques critiques sur le système de Monsr. Leibnitz de l’harmonie préétablie”, “Leibniz Society Review”, VIII, 1998, pp. 80-87. Some of the evidence of connections I discuss here between the two papers could be used to further strengthen the case Lamarra has already made. But since I agree that, on the basis of his arguments, Lamarra is entitled to conclude that Toland’s authorship of the Remarques is, as he claims, “reasonably proved” (op. cit., p. 100), I have taken that as a starting-point. Rather than continue the argument about authorship I have concerned myself with some implications and consequential questions that follow once the question of authorship is taken as settled.

5 This letter is entitled Motion essential to Matter; in Answer to some Remarks by a Noble Friend on the Confutation of Spinoza”. It was published as Letter V of the Letters to Serena (1704). References to it here will be to Letters V followed, where appropriate, by the section number and the page number of the original edition.

6 The Leibniz piece was his Réponse de M. Leibniz aux reflexions contenues dans la seconde édition du Dictionnaire Critique de M. Bayle, article Rorarius, sur le système de l’harmonie préétablie. Leibniz told Bayle that he had written it for him and for “certain selected friends” (Gerhardt, III, p. 63 f.) rather than for the public. It was not published until submitted, together with Toland’s critique and other pieces, by Pierre Desmaizeaux to the Histoire critique, XI, pp. 78-114. Leibniz’s paper is translated into English in Woolhouse & Francks, pp. 107-126. A slightly different text was published in Gerhardt, IV, pp. 554-571 and translated in Loemker, pp. 575-585, where 1702 is mistakenly given as the date of publication.

7 Gerhardt, VI, pp. 499-508.

8 Histoire critique, XI, p. 131.

9 In letters to Bayle Leibniz refers to Toland as “the learned Englishman who brought me your kind regards” (Gerhardt, III, p. 68 and 70). That this is a reference to Toland seems clear from the fact that the person referred to had sent a discussion note to Bayle regarding the entry in his Dictionnaire historique et critique on Dicaearchus, claiming that matter can be made to think. Since Toland had been introduced to him as part of an English diplomatic mission, it would have been natural for Leibniz to assume, as he wrongly did, that Toland was an Englishman.
The evidence of Leibniz’s reaction to the publication of the Remarques is in a letter he wrote to the court librarian in Berlin, Mathurin La Croze, on 9 October, 1716 (DUTENS, V, p. 518). La Croze was also a member of Sophie Charlotte’s circle.

See, e.g., GERHARDT, III, p. 68.

Müller and Kröner’s chronology has Leibniz out of Berlin for part of October, 1702 and again in February, 1703, but in residence there for the whole of the period November through January (MÜLLER & KRÖNERT, pp. 181-183).

Examples of recent scholars who think it is probable that Toland did write the Remarques but who make nothing of it when giving an account of his ideas or his relation to Leibniz are CHIARA GIUNTINI in her Panteismo e ideologia repubblicana: John Toland (1670-1722), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979, p. 162 and ROBERT E. SULLIVAN in his John Toland and the deist Controversy, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982, ch. 6.

Letters, Preface, §§ 4 and 24. He gave as his reason for not including them was that he did not have fair copies. The other two “philosophical letters” he included instead were written respectively to “a Gentleman in Holland” and “a noble Friend”.

Woolhouse suggests (op. cit., p. 83) that one of the others may have been the now lost piece on the theology of the Egyptians. There is also Toland’s reply to Leibniz’s letter on the origin of our ideas (KLOPP, X, pp. 167-177; GERHARDT, VI, pp. 509-514).

There was a footnote reference to a review of one of Berkeley’s books that had appeared in the Histoire critique in 1714. This reference, I believe, was most probably added by the editor of the journal.

This is LAMARRA’s view (op. cit., p. 96). Another possibility is that the date was added by someone else, such as Pierre Desmaizeaux, who was responsible for sending it for publication, perhaps because, lacking a date (as Toland’s copy may have done), it might have appeared less like a proper letter.

Letters V § 31, p. 238.

I am indebted to LAMARRA’s paper for drawing my attention to this “unmistakable reference” (op. cit., p. 102) to Leibniz. It seems likely that Leibniz is also the “worthy friend” (Letters V § 1, p. 164) to whom the letter praising and raising objections to the “Confutation” was written.

To suppose that it was some other court or a merely fictitious court would bring in doubt the identification of Serena with the Queen of Prussia, on which Toland scholars are agreed. Toland himself insisted Serena was “a very real Person” (Letters, Preface § 9), though he would only reveal that she was “Wife to a Man of conspicuous dignity” (Letters, Preface § 4). The identification is, I believe, clinched by the testimony of Jacques Lenfant, who was present when Toland gave, in the presence of the Queen, a paper “On Prejudices” which surely was at least a version of the first of his Letters to Serena. See Bibliothèque germanique ou histoire littéraire de l’Allemagne, de la Suisse, et des Pays du Nord, Amsterdam, 1723, vol. VI, p. 51.

There is a substantial entry on Jakub Henryk Flemming (1667-1728) in the Polski
Fleming was part of the entourage of the Elector of Saxony, who had become King of Poland in 1697.

Leibniz referred to him in his letters to the Electress Sophia as “Monsieur le comte de Fleming”. Sophie Charlotte, writing to her mother, referred to him sometimes as “comte Fleming” though usually just as “Fleming”.

Owing to the improbable fact that there were two military Heinrich von Flemings associated with the Queen’s circle at this time, they have been systematically confused by editors of the available texts, including Klopp (whose index conflates them) and Gerhardt (see Gerhardt, VI, p. 520). In consequence, some of editors of key Leibniz reference works, including E. Bodemann (in Der Briefweschel des Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz..., H anover, H ahn, 1895, p. 58) confuse them. Müller and Kröerner (in Müller & Kröerner, p. 181) are confused about which von Fleming was involved in the discussions with Toland. Heinrich Heino (d. 1706) was an “old friend” of Leibniz’s – much admired by the queen – who lived in retirement in a castle (Buckow) near Berlin. Jakob Heinrich (d. 1728) was new to the court in September, 1702, when the daughter of the other von Fleming was present, providing Leibniz with the occasion in one of his regular letters to the Electress Sophia to give an authoritative clarification (Klopp, VIII, p. 370). In his letters Leibniz refers to the senior von Fleming as “Feldmareschal” and to the younger man as “Monsieur le comte de Fleming”. It was the visiting Saxon count who, on Leibniz’s account, was involved in the discussions with Toland and it is he therefore (and not the Prussian Fieldmarshal) who is the “noble Friend” to whom Letters V is addressed.

Klopp, VIII, p. 396, quoted in Gerhardt, VI, p. 521.

Letters V § 30, p. 234. The italicized words appear to be a quotation from the letter of the “noble Friend”.

It seems to have been occasioned by reading a contribution by Leibniz to his debates with Toland (Klopp, VIII, p. 396).

Toland describes his correspondent as “no less illustrious for his excellent Learning than his noble Family” (Letters, Preface). Fleming’s interest in Spinoza, like Toland’s, may have derived from the time he spent as a student in the Netherlands.

I infer this from the fact that Leibniz was party to the discussions, Fleming having communicated his objections to Toland’s “Confutation” first to Leibniz. It is uncertain whether Leibniz saw Toland’s letter to the noble friend prior to its publication, though there is a curious reference in a 1704 letter to Toland’s forthcoming “dialogues” (Gerhardt, III, p. 299). Leibniz’s description of these as about Toland’s claim that matter contains essentially the principle of movement within itself seems like a Leibnizian paraphrase of the title of Letters V, which he may then have been remembering. Though the claim is also made in Letters IV, the way Letters V quotes and replies to Flemming’s objections suggests the dialogue form Leibniz himself was adopting in relation to Locke. Even if Letters V was sent directly to Flemming, Leibniz may have known of its existence as a reply to Flemming’s objections. Leibniz and Toland were on separate journeys out of Berlin in late October (Doebner, p. 22) and seemed to have less to do with one another towards the end of Toland’s stay.

He took his leave of the Queen on 11 November, 1702 (Doebner, p. 23), and re-
turned to Holland via Hanover, though without seeing the Electress (Klopp, X, p. 402), who had resolved reluctantly to accept the advice not to allow him to be associated with her.

30 See Gerhardt, III, pp. 62-63; Woolhouse & Francks, p. 70.

31 The arrival of “le fameux Toland” was eagerly anticipated by Sophie Charlotte, who was able to tell her mother, in a letter from Lützenburg dated 29 July, that he had finally presented himself (Doebner, p. 16).

32 It seems that anyone who holds that the Remarques was written by Toland must reject either the date or the Berlin address for the completion of the letter, or both. I am inclined to think, like Lamarra, that it is the date is wrong. But the fact is that we have no firm independent evidence that the Queen either commissioned or received Toland’s Remarques. There are a number of possible explanations of why he might still have been working on it in 1703.

33 I differ from Lamarra mainly in thinking that the Remarques was produced after, and incorporated passages from, the paper on “Motion as essential to Matter”. Lamarra’s view was that “there does not seem to be sufficient evidence to support a hypothesis” about how the two texts “relate to each other chronologically” (op. cit., p. 101).

34 “… certain terms, invented for the purpose of the Mathematicians, <for to fix the imagination, & for to improve the Calculs>, > have often been understood by others; & sometimes same mal appliqués par certains Mathématiciens…” (Histoire critique, XI, p. 129).

35 “Quand des notions abstraites sont prises pour des êtres réels…” (ibid.)

36 “… les on posés comme autant de principes <fondamentaux>, sur lesquels ils ont ensuite bâtis des hypothèses” (ibid.)

37 “De cette manière on a soutenu, que les lignes, les surfaces, & les points Mathématiques, existoient réellement dans la nature; & de là on a tiré bien des conclusions; entre autres celle-ci, que l’Étendue étoit composée de points Mathématiques; ce qui est dire, que la longeur la plus petite, & la profondeur, sont formées de ce qui n’est ni long, ni large, ni profond; ou que la mesure résulte de ce qui n’est pas une quantité. De même, le terme d’Infini a été étrangement brouillé; ce qui a causé mille erreurs & équivoques. Le nombre a été censé infini, comme s’il étoit quelque chose de réel; & parce que notre Esprit peut faire une addition d’Unités sans bornes, (vulgairement parlant) on a conclu qu’il existoit actuellement un nombre infini. Il en est de même du temps infini, de la pensée infinie, des lignes asymptotes, & d’un grand nombre d’autres progressions à l’infini; lesquelles sont infinies à la vérité par rapport aux opérations de notre entendement, mais non pas en elles mêmes: car tout ce qui est naturellement infini, est actuellement tel; & ce qui peut seulement être infini, ne l’est assurément point du-tout (Histoire critique, XI, pp. 129-30).

38 There is a corresponding discussion of the abuse of words in Letters V § 7, where Toland writes: “A world of other words are invented to help our imagination, like Scaffolds for the Convenience of the Workmen; but which must be laid aside when the Building is finish’d, and not be mistaken for the Pillars or Foundation” (p. 174).


41 Letters V § 12, p. 18.
42 The work was his Analysis aequationum universalis (1690) and the method is known as “the Newton-Raphson method”. Raphson was made an F. R. S. on the strength of this work.
43 The full title of this work is De spatio reali seu Ente infinito conamen mathematico-metaphysicum. The otherwise good entry on Raphson in The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century British Philosophers (Bristol, Thoemmes, 1999), apparently following COPENHAVER (cited in note 46 below), mistakenly implies that the work was not published before 1702.
44 The reference is in Letters V § 26, p. 219 and seems to be to §§ 24 ff., where Toland is concerned to expose “the most universal mistake” proceeding from belief in the inactivity of matter as “the notion of an infinite, extended, yet incorporeal Space”.
45 The properties of absolute space Raphson claims to demonstrate in chapters 4 and 5 of his book are almost but not quite identical with the list Toland gives (Letters V § 24, p. 214). Moreover RAPHSOHN holds that space is an attribute of the first cause (De Spatio Reali, prop. 13 a, p. 79) and is not far from holding the views Toland ridicules in Letters V § 26, p. 219 f.
46 He acknowledges amongst his predecessors some Cabbalistic philosophers and especially Henry More, whose theory of space was strongly influenced by the Cabbalists and which in turn influenced that of Newton, a connection Raphson (though not, of course, Toland) was happy to make something of. See BRIAN COPENHAVER, Jewish Theologies of Space in the Scientific Revolution: Henry More, Joseph Raphson, “Annals of Science”, XXXVII, 1980, pp. 489-548.
47 Letters V § 26, p. 218. The reference to Raphson’s De spatio reali is on the following page.
48 Letters V § 13, p. 183 f.
49 See Histoire critique, XI, p. 123 f. Leibniz did make some analogy between souls and mathematical points, but only to support his claim that every soul is different from every other.
50 Histoire critique, XI, p. 131.
51 There is not space to argue the point here, but my opinion is that Toland mistakenly supposed that Leibniz was cast in the same philosophical mould as Raphson and so accused him of being a Cabbalistic metaphysicial who believed in absolute incorporeal space and denied the reality of matter.
52 By “instrumentalism” I mean the doctrine (or any of a set of doctrines) according to which the mathematical sciences (including physics and astronomy) need to make use of certain notions in their theoretical apparatus but according to which these notions are mere “instruments” and should not be supposed to represent anything in reality. Toland’s programme of re-interpreting Newton so as to avoid being committed to absolute space or gravity as essential to matter puts him in company, not only with Leibniz but with his younger compatriot Berkeley.
53 Toland used this phrase as if he were quoting Leibniz but it does not appear in the Leibniz paper. It reflects Toland’s mistaken view that Leibniz believed in disembodied minds.
54 Letters V § 30, p. 235 f.
There is a considerable debate in the literature, which I cannot join here, about the exact nature and purpose of this distinction. Writings on these topics I have found particularly helpful and, on important points persuasive, include David Berman, Deism, Immortality, and the Art of Theological Lying, in J. A. Leo Lemay, ed., Deism, Masonry, and the Enlightenment, Newark, University of Delaware Press, 1987; Justin Champion, John Toland and the Politics of Pantheism, “Revue de synthèse”, 116, no. 2-3, 1995, pp. 259-280 and Pierre Lurbe, Clidophonous et la question de la double philosophie, “Revue de synthèse”, 116, no. 2-3, 1995, pp. 379-398.

Letters II § 14, p. 56 f.

Letters II § 14, p. 57.

See, for instance, David Berman’s Deism, Immortality, and the Art of Theological Lying, previously cited.

Socinianism truly Stated... a book usually attributed to Toland, included another work “Indifference in Disputes” recommended by a “Pantheist”. It seems clear, as Justin Champion has argued (op. cit.) that “pantheism” had practical connotations for Toland. And these may even have become more important for him in his later writings. Nonetheless the choice of the term indicates that it also had a metaphysical content.

Clito (1700), p. 8 f.

Histoire critique, X I, p. 124.

Leibniz gave some account of this in a letter of November, 1702. See Gerhardt, III, p. 68; Woolhouse & Francks, p. 128 f.

In his essay The Irish Freethinker, Christianity, p. 227.

Letters V § 30, p. 234.

Arguably, it is only in the last hundred years or so that it has been possible to tell a plausible atheistic story about the chance evolution of highly organized living things.

As Stephen Daniel points out (Christianity, p. 306). Daniel, following Raphson, dismisses it is mere atheism but the way Toland writes about this option in Clito invites a more religious designation.


Raphson defined “pantheism” as “a certain universal substance, material as well as intelligent, that fashions all things that exist out of its own essence” (De spatio reali, p. 2). Toland is likely to have been aware of this earlier use and may indeed have simply been following that use himself. Even if Toland was the first writer to use the word in an English publication, he cannot be credited, as he often has been, with inventing it.

“His spirit was joined with its ethereal father/ from whom it had once proceeded; his body likewise yielding to Nature,/ to be again laid in the lap of its mother: he is about to be resurrected eternally,/ and yet he will never be the same Toland again” (Quoted and transl. from Some Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Mr Toland, 1722).

Such eternal life as individuals can hope for has to do with their being part of something eternal.

“Not plainly to say and profess all you think, or to do it by circumlocution and fig-
ures, is one thing: but it is quite another thing, to speak positively against your own judgement...” (Tetradyumus, 1720, p. 81).

73 The manuscript of this paper contains the note by Leibniz: “1702: à Luzenbourg prés de Berlin” (see Gerhardt, VI, p. 529 n.) It alludes to another paper written in response to Toland, at the Queen’s behest, on what is independent of sense and matter. Its “popular” style, the date and place of its writing, and its religious content all suggest that it belongs to the same sequence of discussions.

74 Loemker, p. 555 ff.; Gerhardt, VI, p. 531 ff.

75 Loemker, p. 559; Gerhardt, VI, p. 537.